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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this appeal, Halton J. Flowers asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support his conviction for felony malicious injury to property, because it did not establish the
value of the damage to the damaged items and the fair market value of the destroyed items
exceeded $1,000. Rather than present evidence on the measure of the value of damages pursuant
to State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698 (Ct. App. 1997), the State improperly relied upon the alleged
victim’s testimony on the original purchase price of the items.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Flowers by information with stalking in the first degree, felony,
I.C. §§ 18-7905(1)(a) and/or (b) and 18-7906, malicious injury to property, felony, I.C. § 187001, and burglary, I.C. §§ 18-1401 to 18-1403. (R., pp.66-68; see R., pp.150-52 (amended
information).) Mr. Flowers decided to represent himself, with standby counsel. (See R., pp.15457, 159-66.) He pleaded not guilty to the charges. (R., p.160.) The district court granted
Mr. Flowers’ motion to bifurcate the trial, ruling that the stalking charge would be tried
separately from the malicious injury to property and burglary charges. (See R., p.161.)
At the jury trial on the malicious injury to property and burglary charges, Lillian Snooks
testified that, as of December 31, 2016, she and Mr. Flowers had been dating for about a month.
(See Tr., p.39, L.20 – p.41, L.23.)1 That day, she went to her grandmother’s house for dinner.
(See Tr., p.42, L.15 – p.43, L.5.) Ms. Snooks and Mr. Flowers had previously made plans to
spend the evening together, and they were texting back and forth about that. (See Tr., p.43, L.13
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All citations to “Tr.” refer to the 276-page PDF version of Additional Reporter’s Transcript,
which includes the Jury Trial transcripts for August 15 and August 16, 2017.
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– p.44, L.5.) She changed her mind because Mr. Flowers was making her nervous. (See
Tr., p.44, Ls.7-19.) Ms. Snooks testified Mr. Flowers was upset because she was not at her
house to spend the evening with him, and he yelled at her when he called her on the phone after
she left her grandmother’s house. (See Tr., p.44, L.14 – p.45, L.6.)
Ms. Snooks testified she left her grandmother’s house around 11:00 or 11:30 PM, and
went to the house of a friend, Scott Lacy. (See Tr., p.44, L.23 – p.45, L.17.) She was at
Mr. Lacy’s house from before 12:00 AM until about 4:00 AM. (See Tr., p.45, Ls.18-19.)
Ms. Snooks testified that, at that point, she did not feel comfortable being around Mr. Flowers.
(See Tr., p.45, Ls.21-25.)
Ms. Snooks’ mother testified that she was also at the grandmother’s house that evening,
and she left around 12:30 AM.

(See Tr., p.181, L.23 – p.183, L.5.)

She testified that

Mr. Flowers contacted her at her house around 1:00 AM. (See Tr., p.183, L.12 – p.184, L.17.)
Ms. Snooks’ mother did not know Mr. Flowers, and he introduced himself as a friend of
Ms. Snooks. (See Tr., p.184, L.18 – p.185, L.2.) Mr. Flowers stated he was very concerned
about Ms. Snooks because she was supposed to meet him that night. (See Tr., p.185, Ls.2-4.)
Ms. Snooks’ mother testified she then tried calling Ms. Snooks, but received no response.
(See Tr., p.187, Ls.13-22.) After Mr. Flowers left, she drove over to Ms. Snooks’ house. (See
Tr., p.187, L.22 – p.188, L.7.) All the lights were on in house, but nobody answered the door.
(See Tr., p.188, L.7 – p.189, L.2.) Ms. Snooks’ mother then drove around until about 3:00 AM,
looking for her daughter. (See Tr., p.189, L.9 – p.190, L.8.)
Next, Ms. Snooks’ mother testified she went back to Ms. Snooks’ house, and when she
arrived, all the lights were off. (See Tr., p.190, Ls.12-19.) Mr. Flowers then walked up to her
car and told her Ms. Snooks was not yet home, but he was trying to fix her doggy door, which
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had fallen out on him. (See Tr., p.190, L.19 – p.191, L.7.) He asked her to follow him into the
house and make sure nothing was missing or messed with.

(See Tr., p.191, Ls.7-9.)

Ms. Snooks’ mother followed him into the house, and Mr. Flowers showed her broken pegs from
the doggy door and stated he was going to fix the doggy door. (See Tr., p.191, L.12 – p.192,
L.19.) She testified the kitchen area of the house looked fairly normal. (See Tr., p.193, L.9 –
p.194, L.4.) Ms. Snooks’ mother left her daughter’s house after her son called and told her to go
home. (See Tr., p.194, L.20 – p.195, L.21.)
Ms. Snooks testified that while she was at Mr. Lacy’s house, she received text messages
from Mr. Flowers stating he was at her house and would go into her house if she did not answer
him. (See Tr., p.46, Ls.1-8.) She was ignoring her phone, and the phone was on silent mode.
(See Tr., p.46, Ls.3-14.) She left Mr. Lacy’s house and arrived at the house of another friend,
Paul, around 4:00 to 4:30 AM. (See Tr., p.46, L.15 – p.47, L.2.) Once there, she received a
phone call from Mr. Flowers, and she told him where she was. (See Tr., p.47, Ls.3-10.)
Ms. Snooks testified Mr. Flowers then drove to Paul’s house and began yelling from
outside. (See Tr., p.47, Ls.11-18.) She went outside and talked with him, and she eventually
admitted to having been at Mr. Lacy’s house. (See Tr., p.47, L.19 – p.48, L.3.) She testified
Mr. Flowers then admitted he had been in her house, and pulled out two dildos he had taken from
her house. (See Tr., p.48, Ls.4-11.) According to Ms. Snooks, Mr. Flowers stated that after she
told him she had slept with Mr. Lacy, he was going to display the dildos at her work and write on
the windows there how big of a slut she was. (See Tr., p.48, Ls.11-16.) She testified he did not
have permission to be in her house or take the dildos. (See Tr., p.49, Ls.8-15.)
Ms. Snooks testified Mr. Flowers also slapped her face, and threatened to mess up her
family’s work and her relationship with her family. (See Tr., p.49, L.16 – p.50, L.7.) She
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decided to go to her house with him, because he said at that point it would all be over. (See
Tr., p.50, Ls.15-19.) She testified he also admitted to taking beer from her house and leaving it
behind a dumpster for a homeless man to enjoy on New Year’s Eve. (See Tr., p.50, Ls.20-25.)
She had not given him permission to take the beer. (See Tr., p.51, Ls.1-2.)
Ms. Snooks testified that, when they arrived at her house, she did not see the beer, and
noticed some clothes that had been bleached.

(See Tr., p.51, Ls.12-19.)

She testified

Mr. Flowers stated he had been washing clothes and spilled some bleach. (See Tr., p.51, Ls.1621, p.55, Ls.19-23.)

Mr. Flowers stayed at her house until about 4:30 PM to 5:00 PM on

January 1, 2017, and after he left Ms. Snooks went to the police. (See Tr., p.58, L.16 – p.59,
L.2.)
Ms. Snooks testified her doggy door was intact when she had left her house on
December 31. (See Tr., p.59, Ls.15-19.) When she returned to her house in the early morning
hours of January 1, the doggy door had been kicked in, the bolts had been replaced by metal
bolts, and there was a sticky note on the door stating, “I’m sorry, I forgot you got a new dog
door.” (See Tr., p.59, Ls.20-25.)
A couple days later, Ms. Snooks again contacted law enforcement. (See Tr., p.60, L.23 –
p.61, L.2.) She testified she contacted law enforcement in relation to other damaged clothing
and items she found in rooms in her house after January 1. (See Tr., p.61, Ls.2-24.) Including
the bleached clothes and doggy door, Ms. Snooks testified about twenty-five items had been
damaged or destroyed. (See generally Tr., p.61, L.25 – p.93, L.10; Appendix A.)2 The items
ranged from a wedding dress (see Tr., p.67, L.23 – p.71, L.24), to a laptop computer and a tablet
(see Tr., p.83, L.17 – p.88, L.9), to an owl mug (see Tr., p.80, L.11 – p.81, L.2). For the majority

2

Appendix A is a list of the damaged and destroyed items, as testified to by Ms. Snooks.
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of the items, Ms. Snooks presented testimony on the purchase date and original purchase price.
(See generally Tr., p.56, L.14 – p.58, L.15, p.61, L.25 – p.92, L.18; Appendix A.)
However, Ms. Snooks did not present testimony on the value of almost all of the items as
of January 1, 2017. (See Tr., p.105, L.6 – p.107, L.4; Appendix A.) On cross-examination,
Ms. Snooks testified, “No, I did not have the clothes appraised by anyone as of January 1 st.”
(Tr., p.105, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Flowers asked, “do you know the used fair market value of these items
as of January 1st?” and she replied, “Well, it depends on the items. Some of the items, yes.”
(Tr., p.105, Ls.10-13.) But when Mr. Flowers then inquired, “Ms. Snooks, do you know the used
market value, fair appraisal value, for these items as of January 1st?” she answered, “No.”
(Tr., p.105, Ls.14-20.)

Further, Mr. Flowers asked, “Did you get a repair quote from a

seamstress as of January 1st?” and Ms. Snooks replied, “No, I did not.” (Tr., p.105, Ls.21-23.)
She also testified on cross-examination that she did not have her laptop or her tablet appraised as
of January 1. (See Tr., p.106, Ls.5-7, p.107, Ls.2-4.)
Ms. Snooks testified on cross-examination that laptops and tablets lose value over time.
(See Tr., p.106, L.15 – p.107, L.1.) Moreover, she testified that items in a thrift store are worth
less because they are used, and clothing loses its value after being worn. (See Tr., p.104, L.22 –
p.105, L.2.)
After the State rested, Mr. Flowers made an oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29 (Rule 29)
motion for a judgment of acquittal. (See Tr., p.216, L.8 – p.220, L.25.) Mr. Flowers requested
the district court dismiss the burglary charge for insufficient evidence. (See Tr., p.216, L.14 –
p.217, L.20.) As for the malicious injury to property charge, Mr. Flowers asserted there was
insufficient evidence connecting him to the damaged or destroyed property. (See Tr., p.217,
L.21 – p.219, L.7.) Mr. Flowers also asserted, “the state has failed to meet the burden of proof
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for the price—the fair market value of these items before they were destroyed and not the new
price of when they were bought . . . .” (Tr., p.219, Ls.8-12.) He asked, “But should this go to a
jury if the state has failed to provide one accurate, due diligence appraisal or a witness up there,”
who “has the ability and knowledge to testify to used clothing and has actually done appraisals
on these items and what their condition would have been right before they were cut or look them
up when they were cut and say, hey, this is what they would have been worth without the cuts?”
(Tr., p.219, L.18 – p.220, L.1.) He asserted, “Because these are all used items, a couple years
old. Electronics lose value immediately when you buy them.” (Tr., p.220, Ls.2-4.) Mr. Flowers
additionally asserted he had not been connected to the electronics. (See Tr., p.220, Ls.4-8.)
Mr. Flowers then asserted, “the state has failed to actually prove one significant price that
is valid for meeting a thousand dollars’ threshold as is required in this case.” (Tr., p.220, Ls.912.) He asserted, “all the items except for a swimsuit top and some wax candles were used
items, as testified by her. And also that used items do lose value, and they are not worth the
same as when they were bought new.” (Tr., p.220, Ls.12-16.) Further, Mr. Flowers asserted the
values the State had produced “could be misleading the jury,” and were “not usable to meet the
threshold of price.

And that’s the key element needed for malicious injury to property.”

(Tr., p.220, Ls.17-22.) Mr. Flowers concluded, “There was absence of evidence, and I request to
dismiss per Criminal Rule 29 of the Idaho Criminal Rules.” (Tr., p.220, Ls.23-25.)
In response, the State argued it had presented sufficient evidence to send the burglary
charge to the jury. (See Tr., p.221, Ls.4-11.) On malicious injury to property, the State argued,
“The amount they’re going to be giving on the property damage, they can decide whatever
weight and credibility they want to give to that and come up with whatever values they think are
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appropriate.” (Tr., p.221, Ls.12-16.) The State contended, “So as far as burglary on the stolen
items and malicious injury to the property, we meet the threshold.” (Tr., p.221, Ls.16-18.)
Mr. Flowers replied, “the state just said, let the jury come up with whatever values they
deem appropriate, and that is in violation of [State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698 (Ct. App.
1997)] . . . .” (See Tr., p.222, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Flowers asserted, “where if the state has failed to
ascertain the value of the items or determine that the value is unascertainable, that they have not
got any prices for a like item of the same quality or condition, under Hughes, that they have
failed to meet their burden of proof that it was over a thousand dollars.” (Tr., p.222, Ls.3-9.)
The district court determined, “The court’s considered the motion and the response from
the state, and I’m going to deny the motion.” (Tr., p.222, Ls.16-18.)
Mr. Flowers did not testify in his defense. (See Tr., p.225, L.24 – p.226, L.2.) He
objected to the district court instructing the jury on a lesser included offense of misdemeanor
injury to property.

(See Tr., p.229, Ls.2-8.) As Mr. Flowers requested, the district court

removed the misdemeanor malicious injury to property charge from the jury instructions. (See
Tr., p.232, Ls.16-19.)
The district court did instruct the jury that, “As used in this instruction, ‘value’ means the
lesser of the following amounts: (A), the difference between the fair market value of the
property before it was injured or destroyed and its fair market value afterward; (B), the
reasonable cost of repairing the injury caused to the property.” (Tr., p.238, L.23 – p.239, L.3.)
The district court also instructed the jury, “The term ‘fair market value’ means the price that a
reasonably prudent purchaser would pay for the property under the market conditions prevailing
at the time.” (Tr., p.239, Ls.4-7.)

7

In closing arguments, the State argued: “And even the most conservative calculator will
assess the value well above a thousand dollars. You’ll have instructions on valuation. You get
to use your own experience and knowledge.” (Tr., p.248, Ls.4-8.) The State discussed how used
items could get donated to a thrift store, which would then sell them at a discounted rate. (See
Tr., p.248, Ls.8-12.) The State then contended the jury should consider that Ms. Snooks “had
not donated any of the items. They were still in her possession, and she still used them. They
still had value to her.”

(Tr., p.248, Ls.13-15.)

The State argued, “And when they were

destroyed, they . . . no longer served their purpose and they needed to be replaced.” (Tr., p.248,
Ls.15-18.)
The jury found Mr. Flowers guilty of burglary and malicious injury to property.
(R., p.300; Tr., p.269, L.22 – p.272, L.9.) Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Flowers
then pleaded guilty to an amended charge of misdemeanor stalking in the second degree. 3 (See
R., pp.354-57, pp.359-61.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, for the
malicious injury to property charge, a concurrent unified sentence of ten years, with four years
fixed, for the burglary charge, and a concurrent unified sentence of ten months in jail for the
stalking charge. (R., pp.366-70.) Mr. Flowers filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district
court’s Minute Entry & Order—Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.371-74; see R., pp.394-400
(Amended Notice of Appeal), pp.403-09 (Second Amended Notice of Appeal).)

3

Mr. Flowers has waived the misdemeanor stalking issue on appeal.
8

ISSUE
Did the State fail to present sufficient evidence to support Mr. Flowers’ conviction for felony
malicious injury to property, because it did not establish the value of the damage to the damaged
items and the fair market value of the destroyed items exceeded $1,000?

9

ARGUMENT
The State Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence To Support Mr. Flowers’ Conviction For Felony
Malicious Injury To Property, Because It Did Not Establish The Value Of The Damage To The
Damaged Items And The Fair Market Value Of The Destroyed Items Exceeded $1,000

A.

Introduction
Mr. Flowers asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his

conviction for felony malicious injury to property, because it did not establish the value of the
damage to the damaged items and the fair market value of the destroyed items exceeded $1,000.
Mr. Flowers asserted the State has not met its burden of proof to show the value of the items
exceeded $1,000. (See Tr., p.219, L.8 – p.220– L.25, p.222, Ls.1-9.) The district court denied
Mr. Flowers’ Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal without explanation. (See Tr., p.222,
Ls.16-18.) However, the State did not establish the value of the damage to the damaged items
and the fair market value of the destroyed items, at the time of the incident, exceeded the
threshold amount of $1,000. (See generally Appendix A.) Thus, the jury could not properly find
that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of felony malicious
injury to property.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 provides, “After the prosecution closes its evidence or after the

close of all the evidence, the court on defendant’s motion or on its own motion, must enter a
judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction.” I.C.R. 29(a). As part of the right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a
criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a
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trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When an appellate court determines whether a conviction should be upheld, the relevant
inquiry is whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Put otherwise, the
inquiry is “whether there is substantial evidence upon which that the State met its burden of
proving the essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt.”

See id.

In

conducting this analysis, an appellate court “is required to consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State,” and will not substitute its “judgment for that of the jury on issues of
witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724 (2007)).

C.

The State Did Not Establish The Value Of The Damage To The Damaged Items And The
Fair Market Value Of The Destroyed Items Exceeded $1,000
Mr. Flowers asserts the State did not establish the value of the damage to the damaged

items and fair market value of the destroyed items exceeded $1,000. Thus, the jury could not
properly find that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of felony
malicious injury to property.
The malicious injury to property statute, I.C. § 18-7001, “specifies that the offense of
malicious injury to property may be either a misdemeanor or a felony, depending upon the value
of the damage.” State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 702 (Ct. App. 1997). Section 18-7001
currently provides, “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, every person
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who maliciously injures or destroys any real or personal property not his own . . . is guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . .” I.C. § 18-7001(1). Pursuant to subsection (2), “A person is guilty of a
felony, if . . . [t]he damages caused by a violation of this section exceed one thousand dollars
($1,000) in value . . . .” I.C. § 18-7001(2)(a). “[U]nder this statute, when a felony violation is
charged, the State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the
property damage exceeded $1,000.” Hughes, 130 Idaho at 702.
Here, the only evidence offered by the State addressing the severity and value of damage
to the items was the testimony of Ms. Snooks. (See generally Appendix A.) For the majority of
the damaged or destroyed items in this case, the State relied upon Ms. Snooks’ testimony on the
original purchase price of the items. (See, e.g., Tr., p.68, Ls.16-22, p.71, Ls.11-24 (she bought
the wedding dress with alterations for $800 in 2013), Tr., p.80, Ls.2-6 (she bought the black tank
top for $15 in 2014).) For some other items, Ms. Snooks did not even provide testimony on the
original purchase price. (See, e.g., Tr., p.60, Ls.5-22 (she did not have a price for the doggy
door).) However, under Hughes the original purchase price was not the proper means of
measuring damage.
In Hughes, the Idaho Court of Appeals resolved the issue of “[w]hat is the proper
measure of the ‘value’ of damages within the meaning of I.C. § 18-7001?” Hughes, 130 Idaho at
702. The Hughes Court held, “Either the diminution of the object’s fair market value or the
reasonable cost of repair is a fair means of measuring damage when the offender has harmed but
not destroyed the property.” Id. at 703. “If the State applies the diminution of value measure,
then it must establish the fair market value of the property immediately before and after the
damage.” Id. “When the cost of repair is chosen, this measure may not exceed the market value
of the item before the damage, for an ‘offender cannot cause an economic loss that surpasses the
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actual value of the property damaged.’” Id. (quoting People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890, 895
(Colo. 1983)).
The Hughes Court also held: “When property has been entirely destroyed, neither the
cost of repair measure nor the diminution in value measure are applicable. The property measure
of damages in such event is the fair market value of the property at the time and place of its
destruction.” Id.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals held: “In some cases the destroyed item may have no
market value or the value may not be ascertainable. Therefore, upon a showing that fair market
value cannot be established, the State may show the economic value of the loss caused by the
defendant through such factors as original purchase price, replacement cost, the property’s
general use and purpose, and salvage value.” Id. “If the State attempts to prove value through
replacement cost, however, we think it incumbent upon the State to produce some evidence that
the replacement item is of a quality and design comparable to that of the destroyed item.” Id.
Mr. Flowers alluded to this holding when he brought up Hughes before the district court. (See
Tr., p.222, Ls.1-9.)
The Hughes Court held “that replacement cost evidence may be used as an indicator of
value only when the State has demonstrated that the fair market value of the destroyed item is
not reasonably ascertainable or that the item had no market value . . . .” Hughes, 130 Idaho at
703.

“[W]hen replacement cost evidence is relied upon, the State must show that the

replacement (whether actually purchased by the victim or not) is a reasonably close proximation
of the design and quality of the destroyed item.” Id.
In light of the Hughes standards, the State did not establish the value of the damage to the
damaged items and the fair market value of the destroyed items exceeded $1,000. In no event
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did Ms. Snooks testify as to the value of the damage to the damaged items, either through the
diminution of the items’ fair market value or the reasonable cost of repair. (See Tr., p.105, L.6 –
p.107, L.4; Appendix A.) Rather, her testimony on the value of the items was based on the
original purchase price of the items. (See Appendix A; see also Tr., p.100, L.17 – p.101, L.1
(describing how she told an officer the value of the items based on their original purchase
price).) For example, Ms. Snooks testified she bought the slashed kitchen table as part of a used
kitchen set for $40 in 2014. (See Tr., p.89, Ls.8-17.)
But under Hughes, the original purchase price was not the proper measure of value for
damaged items. See Hughes, 130 Idaho at 703. Further, the proper measure of value was not, as
the State asserted, for the jury to “decide whatever weight and credibility they want to give to
that and come up with whatever values they think are appropriate.” (See Tr., p.221, Ls.12-15).
The proper measure of value was either the diminution of the items’ fair market value or the
reasonable cost of repairs. See Hughes, 130 Idaho at 703.
The State did not establish the fair market value of any of the damaged items
immediately before and after the damage. (See Appendix A.) Nor did the State establish the
cost of repair of any of the damaged items. For example, with respect to the damaged clothes,
Ms. Snooks testified she did not get a repair quote from a seamstress as of January 1, 2017. (See
Tr., p.105, Ls.21-22.) Moreover, although she described in detail what actions it would take to
repair her office room floor, she did not provide a value for the cost to fix it. (See Tr., p.91, Ls.824.) Thus, the State did not establish the value of the damage to the damaged items. See
Hughes, 130 Idaho at 703.
Similarly, the State did not establish the fair market value of the bulk of the destroyed
items. With the exception of the lotion poured onto the office room floor (see Tr., p.90, Ls.9-
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12), Ms. Snooks did not testify as to the fair market value of any of the destroyed items at the
time and place of their destruction. For example, even though her laptop and tablet would not
turn on, Ms. Snooks did not have those items appraised as of January 1. (See Tr., p.106, Ls.5-7,
p.107, Ls.2-4.) While the State relied upon Ms. Snooks’ testimony on the original purchase price
of the destroyed items, the original purchase price measure of damage was improper because the
State made no effort to show the market value of those items was unascertainable.

(See

generally Appendix A.) Thus, the State did not establish the fair market value of the bulk of the
destroyed items. See Hughes, 130 Idaho at 703.
In sum, the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to meet the State’s burden to
prove, as a requisite element of felony malicious injury to property, that the property damage
caused by Mr. Flowers exceeded $1,000.

See id. at 704.

The jury’s determination that

Mr. Flowers was guilty of felony malicious injury to property therefore cannot stand. See id.
Because the State did not establish the value of the damage to the damaged items and fair
market value of the destroyed items exceeded $1,000, the jury could not properly find that the
State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of felony malicious injury to
property. Even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to support Mr. Flowers’ conviction for felony malicious injury to
property. See Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460; I.C. § 18-7001. Mr. Flowers’ judgment of conviction
for felony malicious injury to property should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to
the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge.4 See I.C.R. 29(a).

4

In Hughes, the jury had been instructed on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor
malicious injury to property, and the Court of Appeals held, “The jury’s finding that Hughes
inflicted damage on the door is supported by the evidence; only valuation evidence was lacking.”
Hughes, 130 Idaho at 704. The Hughes Court then held, “the charge of which [Hughes] has been
found guilty must be reduced to a misdemeanor.” See id. Conversely, in this case the jury was
15

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Flowers respectfully requests this Court reverse his judgment
of conviction for felony malicious injury to property, and remand the matter to the district court
for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge.
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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not instructed on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor malicious injury to property. (See
Tr., p.232, Ls.16-19.) Thus, the proper relief here is reversal of the judgment of conviction for
felony malicious injury to property, and remand to the district court for the entry of a judgment
of acquittal on that charge.
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APPENDIX A
List of Damaged and Destroyed Items
Item

Damage

Striped dress
shirt

Bleached (see
Tr., p.55, L.19 –
p.56, L.20)
Bleached (see
Tr., p.55, L.19 –
p.56, L.20)
Bleached (see
Tr., p.55, L.19 –
p.56, L.20)
Kicked in; bolts
replaced by
metal bolts (Tr.,
p.59, Ls.20-25)

Dress pants

St. Patrick’s Day
shirt
Doggy door

Graduation dress

Boots

Wedding dress
(with alterations)

White jacket

Date of
Purchase
2014 (Tr., p.58,
Ls.4-8)

Original
Purchase Price
$25 (Tr., p.58,
Ls.4-6)

Fair Market
Value on 1/1/17
N/A

NA (see Tr.,
p.58, Ls.9-11)

$30 (Tr., p.58,
Ls.9-11)

N/A

NA (see Tr.,
p.58, Ls.11-13)

$15 (Tr., p.58,
Ls.11-13)

N/A

N/A (see Tr.,
p.60, Ls.5-22)

N/A

$90 (Tr., p.62,
L.25 – p.63, L.3)

N/A

$150 (Tr., p.63,
Ls.14-21)

N/A

$800 (Tr., p.68,
Ls.16-19, p.71,
Ls.11-24)

N/A

$150 (Tr., p.72,
Ls.10-16)

N/A

“It had just been
put in . . . . I
don’t remember
the exact date
that the
construction
people put it in.”
(Tr., p.135,
Ls.15-23)
2012 or 2013
Three slashes; “it
(see Tr., p.63,
was cut up.” (Tr.,
Ls.4-9)
p.62, Ls.10-14)
Spring 2016 (Tr.,
“[T]wo big
p.63, Ls.22-23)
slashes on the
sides” (Tr., p.63,
Ls.12-13)
2013 (Tr., p.68,
“[C]ut up, all
Ls.20-22)
over”; multiple
slashes in several
areas (Tr., p.68,
Ls.1-7)
Summer 2015
“[S]lashed on the
(Tr., p.72, Ls.10sides of it, on
14)
both sides. And
then there was a
slash in the
back.” (Tr., p.72,
Ls.2-6)
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Item

Damage

Pink dress shirt

“[S]lashes and
cuts all over it”
(Tr., p.72, Ls.2123)
Designer jeans
Cut up (Tr., p.73,
L.24 – p.74, L.3)
Jeans with flower Cut up (see Tr.,
design
p.73, L.5 – p.74,
L.3)
Regular jeans
“[S]lashed up”
(Tr., p.76, Ls.56)
Jean shorts
“[S]liced from
the bottom of the
shorts up to the
butt pockets”
(Tr., p.78, Ls.67)
Black tank top
It “was all cut
up” (Tr., p.79,
Ls.22-23)
Candle warmer
“[C]ompletely
broke in half. . . .
It’s not usable
anywhere.” (Tr.,
p.81, Ls.6-9)
Owl mug
It “had a big V
chip out of it”
(Tr., p.81, Ls.1011)
Owl candle

It “looked like it
had been thrown.
The beak and the
foot were
smushed in on
it.” (Tr., p.81,
Ls.13-14)

Date of
Purchase
2016 (Tr., p.73,
Ls.3-4)

Original
Purchase Price
$55 (Tr., p.72,
L.24 – p.73, L.2)

Fair Market
Value on 1/1/17
N/A

2016 (Tr., p.75,
Ls.5-12)
2012 (Tr., p.75,
L.25 – p.76, L.1)

$50 (Tr., p.75,
Ls.1-3)
$35 to $45 (Tr.,
p.75, Ls.20-24)

N/A

2014 (Tr., p.76,
Ls.14-16)

$20 to $25 (Tr.,
p.76, Ls.10-13)

N/A

2016 (Tr., p.78,
Ls.11-13)

$25 (Tr., p.78,
Ls.16-17)

N/A

2014 (Tr., p.80,
Ls.7-9)

$15 (Tr., p.80,
Ls.2-6)

N/A

A Christmas
present, received
on 12/25/16 (see
Tr., p.80, Ls.2123)
A Christmas
present, received
on 12/25/16 (see
Tr., p.80, Ls.2123)
A Christmas
present, received
on 12/25/16 (see
Tr., p.80, Ls.2123)

$30 (Tr., p.80,
L.25 – p.81, L.1)

N/A

$16 (Tr., p.81,
Ls.1-2)

N/A

$16 or $16.99
(Tr., p.82, Ls.1316)

N/A
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N/A

Item

Damage

Swimsuit
coverup

“It was
completely torn
up.” (Tr., p.83,
Ls.7-10)
“It was slashed
up as well.” (Tr.,
p.83, Ls.15-16)
“After the 3rd the
computer won’t
even turn on
now.” (Tr., p.83,
Ls.20-23)
It “would not
turn on or
charge” (Tr.,
p.86, Ls.5-12)

Camo tank top

HP computer

Samsung tablet

Kitchen table

One slash to the
top of the table
(Tr., p.88, Ls.1021)

Lotion

The lotion had
been squeezed
onto the floor in
her office room,
and poured over
a lunchbox (see
Tr., p.89, L.23 –
p.90, L.6)
“[T]here’s a big
stain” in the
corner; also a
slash in the floor
(Tr., p.91, Ls.56, p.92, Ls.1-2)

Office room
floor

Date of
Purchase
NA (see Tr.,
p.83, Ls.1-10)

Original
Purchase Price
$25 (Tr., p.83,
Ls.4-6)

Fair Market
Value on 1/1/17
N/A

2015 or Summer
2016 (Tr., p.83,
Ls.11-13)
“When Windows
8 had come out.”
(Tr., p.84, Ls.12)5

$15 (Tr., p.83,
Ls.13-14)

N/A

$900 (Tr., p.84,
Ls.3-4)

N/A

$500 (Tr., p.86,
L.17 – p.88, L.4)

N/A

$40 for the full
used set of table
and chairs (see
Tr., p.89, Ls.814)
N/A (see Tr.,
p.90, Ls.8-12)

N/A

Ms. Snooks’ exhusband gifted it
to her on
Christmas 2015
(see Tr., p.86,
L.3 – p.87, L.8)
2014 (Tr., p.89,
Ls.15-17)

She started
selling the lotion
in 2016 (see Tr.,
p.90, Ls.13-17)

She bought the
house in May of
2014 (see Tr.,
p.41, Ls.13-14)

5

N/A (see Tr.,
p.91, Ls.8-24)

She sold bottles
of the lotion for
$18 each (Tr.,
p.90, Ls.11-12)

N/A

Microsoft released the Windows 8 operating system on October 26, 2012. See, e.g., Steve
Kovach, Microsoft Will Launch Windows 8 On October 26, Business Insider (Jul. 18, 2012 4:55
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/windows-8-launch-date-2012-7.
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